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LERXER P. SllPERlOR COURT

[~.
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UH4S.

In Bunk.

Mar. 25, 1952.]

l38 U.2d

\

m<},!'TY F. LERNEH. l'etitiolH·r. Y. SUPl<~RIOH COUH'l' 01"
SAX MATEO COCN'rY. Ht'spoudt'nt; CIJAHENCE F.

I.JEUNER, Real Party in Interest.

)

[1] Appeal-Meet-Powers of Trial Court Pending Appeal.-In
view of COllt' Ch·. Pro(' .• ~ 9-16. dt'claring that whenewr an
appeal is perf<,dt'd it stll~-'" nll furthm' pro('('l'dings in the
lower court, an nppl'lll hom II custod~' m'del" ,ll')JI"ives tht' trial
court of jurisdiction to changl' the custolly statu:; at the time
of the app<'a1.
[2] Id.-Effect-Powers of Trial Court Pending Appeal.-After
trial court loses jurisdiction on perfection of lin appeal from
a custody order, the eonst'nt of the parties is inf'ffective to reinvest such ('ourt with jurisdiction O\'l'r the subject matter of.
the appeal.
[3a-3e] Divorce - Custody of Children-Appeal-E1fect.-Where
di\"orce decrl't~ gave It·gal custody of son to both parties jointly,
but thE'reafter trial court awarded custody to the dh'orced
hushand suhject to eoudition that hoy hE' kept in school within
statE', and the divorced wife appealed, the trial court is without jurisdiction to permit the divorced husband to send the
bo~' to a school in ullotIlt'r state, since such remo\"al would
!<ubstantially destroy the custody status at the time the uppeal
was tllkl·n. in violation of Code Civ. Prof'., § 946.
[4] Id.-Custody of Children-Essence.-Essl'ne(' of eU5tody of a
ehild is the companionship of the child and the right to make
dpcisions regarding his ellre and control, ('ducation, health,
and religion.
[5] Id.-Custody of Children-Appeal-E1fect.-Phrase in Code
Civ. Proe.,.~ 946, that an appeal stays "all further proceedings
in the court below upon the judgment or ordpr appealed from,"
must be interpreted to include action by 1\ trial court giving

[IJ See Cal.Jur., Appeal and Error, § 179; Am.Jur., Appeal and
Error, § 530.
[3] .JUI·isdiction of h'illl 01' lIpp .. llllh· l'O\H·t ill l"l'sp'!ct of cu,;tod~'
of ehililr('ll 1)(,I\llin~ uPP"ul from order or decree ill divorce suit,
llott~ Hi3 A.L.R. 1319. RI,t', nlso, Cal.JuT., DiYoree :lI1t1 Separation.
~

l·n.

McK. Dig. References: llJ Appeal and En'm', ~3::n; [:!J Appeal
!lnt! Enor, ~3~O; [3J).~-10J Divol"l'e, §288; [-11 Divorce, §:!71:
[6. lllDi\·lJrc(·. §272; l7] Divol'el', ~287: [12J Prohibition, §40;
P3l DiYorc(', ~ l7.i; [H,18] Di\'ol"cc, § 197; [15,16] Prohibition,
§ 1; [17J ~!andamus, § 107.

)

~Ial'.

I !l~):! J

LEIC,U{ /'. ~lJl'I-:H[()I{ COUWJ'

fi77

I:lB C.2d 676; 242 P.2d 3211

.. telllporal'~··' pl'l"Illi~~iOll to tak.· a .. hibl fl'om tllf> ~tatp prn.ling
npP"'al from rI "l1~t"dy ornl'r.
[6] ld.-Custody of Children--Jurisdiction. .\ II hllll.zh 11 nHly Iw
a~sulll"d that a l"alifol'lli;1 "l1"tll,ly .1".'\"1'.' wonlt! ... ·.·pi"e the
~;lllle !"I'''il''!'! in oth,'1' "tatl'S that fOl'pign C'l1"tody .it'erees rl'".·i".· in om' \'\l\lrh, phy"ieal PI"l'Sl'IH'r in n fOI't'ign ;;tatt' of the
"hil.1 ill\·oh,,.d ill thl' California UP('n'!' would gin· till' foreign
statl' jUl'i.-didil>ll to d"l'i,[.· for its"lf what ,wtion would bt' ill
his h,'st intl'l'l'sts.
[7] ld.-Custody of Children-Modification.-l'ustody decl'ees are
unin·rsally suhj .. d to 1lI0dification Oil a showillg" of facts which
I'efjuirr a ehangp in tIl!' (ll'd('l' to protret what the court considers th.' w('lfal'P of the child.
[8] ld.-Custody of Children-Appeal-Effect.-\Yhill' the paralliount conN'rll in eustnd~' proct'pdillgs is the welfare of the
('hilt!, thl' di\'ol'ct'(l wif" ha» the right and duty, pending appeal
t'!'Olll an ordt'l' awarding l'ustody of the child to the divorced
husband on ('ondition that the ehild lll' kl'pt in school within
statt'. to SlIft·guanl tht' ehil.l until dl't\'rlllination of the appeal;
nud if she do(':> Hot ngT('1' with tIlt' di\'orced husband's assertion that tilt' IH'st illtl't'{·~ts of tIll' (·hild require his attendance
nt a tH·hool ollbidl' tIlt' statl', questiolls of the child's educatioll
nI'l' g-on'!'!wd hy pro\'ision:; of the <li\'ol'l'e deereI'.
[9] Id. - Custody of Children - Appeal-Effect.-Fnct that trial
eourt, pt'IHling appt'nl from a custody order, has jurisdiction
to require a di';or('l'd !tu.,haud to make payments for child
support (Civ. Code, ~ 137,2) dOl'S not menn thnt it has power
to j;;SUl' ol'dt'rs which would 1'1'11<11'1' futile the Ilppellate determination on the merits.
[10] ld.-Custody of Children-AppeaL-A litigant in a custody
action is entitled to nppt'llllte review before his rights are
tinally deterlllined.
[11] ld.-Custody of Children-Jurisdiction.-An ol'der which so
disturhs the cu;>tody of n child as to permit hilll to be taken
out of the :state, peudillg final determination of an appeal from
u custody order, would he an act in excess of' the jurisdiction
of the trial court.
[12] Prohibition-Custody Proceedings.-Prohibition will issue to
preveut till' trial ('(JUrt fro III t'ntel'ing lin order which will permit a father to take his child Iwyond the court's jurisdiction
p(·udillg fiual tld(~rlllillatiun o[ the question whether such
fnther is entitled to the child's custotly.

[6] gxtraterritorial effect of provision in decree of divorce as
to custody of child, note, 160 A.L.R. 400. See, also, Cal.Jur., Di\'orc(' and Scpal'ation, § 142; Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation,
~ 688.
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[13] Divorce-Counsel Fees and Costs.-Policy undcrlying. Civ.
Code, ~ 137.3, with rpgard to requiring the husband during the
pendency of a divorce actioll to pay such alllount as lIlay be
reasonably Il('C('f;sary for costs and attorney's fees, is controlling whethl'r the action is one in which a wOllfRn is compelled
by her former husband to resist by an appeal a proceeding
brought by him to modify a custody or alimony award, or
whether the action is one in which she is compelled to seek
prohibition to prevent improper modification of such awards.
[14] Id. - Counsel Fees and Costs - Prohibition. - Civ. Code,
~ 137.3, is not framed to limit its application to actions in
which the other spouse is a "plaintiff" or "defendant," but
applies to prohibition proceedings in which the superior court
is the respondent but the husband, from whom attorney's fees
and costs are sought, is the real party in interest.
[15] Prohibition-Nature of Writ.-While the writ of prohibition
was formerly used by the king's courts to increase their authority at the expense of the ecclesiastical courts, and the lower
court was thus a party to the litigation in a substantial sense,
in California practice an application to an appellate court for
the writ is simply one of several means by which a litigant
may obtain a review of action or threatened action by a trial
court.
[16] Id.-Purpose of Writ.-The objective of a writ of prohibition
is the same as in an appeal, to prevent the trial court from
taking action favorable to the other party.
[17] Mandamus-Counsel Fees.-Counsel fees may be recovered by
former wife in mandamus proceedings arising out of divorce
action in which the superior court is the nominal respondent
but the former husband is real party in interest. (Civ. Code,
§ 137.3.)
[18] Divorce - Counsel Fees and Costs - Prohibition.-Supreme
Court is not the proper forum for determination of counsel
fees and costs incurred in a prohibition proceeding to restrain
the trial court from permitting a divorced husband to send
a child of the divorced parties to a school in another state
prior to determination of an appeal involving his right to
the custody of such child; the trial court is better qualified
than an appellate court to pass on the amount of suit money
which should be awarded, and is not deprived of jurisdiction
to award counsel fees because the action is an original proceeding before the appellate court.

PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior
Court of San Mateo County from making any order which
would permit temporary removal of a minor child of petitioner
and her divorced husband from the state prior to final deter-
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mination of an appeal involving the custody of such child.
Writ granted; petitioner's motion for attorney fees and costs
denied without prejudice.
Marvin E. Lewis, Goldstein, Lewis & Barceloux for Petitioner.
Cosgriff, Carr, McClellan & Ingersoll and Frank V. Kington
for Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-During their marriage, Clarence and Betty
Lerner adopted two children, Gerald and Linda. The marriage
failed, and a final decree of divorce was entered on May 10,
1948. The decree awarded legal custody of the children to
Clarence and Betty jointly, and physical custody to Betty
for the greater part of each year. No appeal was taken from
the final decree. On May 25, 1950, both parties consented
to an order modifying the custody provisions of the final
divorce decree to allow Gerald to attend the Menlo School for
Boys as a full-time student.
On March 9, 1951, after application by Clarence, the final
decree was modified to award custody of Gerald to his father,
subject to the condition that the boy "be kept enrolled in
school as at present." Betty promptly appealed from the
March 9th order and her appeal is presently pending before
this court.
On JUly 16, 1951, Clarence served notice that he would
seek an order from the trial court authorizing him to enter
Gerald as a student in the Oxford Academy of Individual
Education, Pleasantville, New Jersey. Court permission for
removal of the boy was necessary because the March 9th order
granting custody to Clarence was conditional on Gerald's
attendance at the Menlo School. The motive for Clarence's
action is in dispute. Clarence alleges that Gerald cannot
adjust himself to class instruction and requires individual
education, that the Menlo School refused to accept him for
another term,· that educational authorities and a child psychiatrist recommended enrollment in the Oxford Academy,
and that it will cost Clarence approximately $10,000 annually
to send the boy to the New Jersey school. Betty asserts, however, that Gerald is a bright normal boy, that educational
authorities inform her that it is not only unnecessary but would
·Pending determination of the prohibition proceeding, however, the
Menlo School haa accepted the boy.

)
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bp hal'lllfni for Geralll to Ilth'nd the Oxford Atademy, and
that the 1't'al llIotiw for till' boy's rpmoval to New Jersey is
to tt·ansfl·r him :1,000 mil<,s from Bt'tty.
On .J uly 23. If);) 1. lit t 1](' Ill'al'illg" on Clarence's Illotion,
Bt'tty ad"ist'd tlip tt'iHleourt that the filing of the appeal from
tl)(' l\Iar(·h !lth (,l\stod~· ord<'r had deprived the trial court of
jurisdil'tion til make furthl'r modifications of the custody provisions of tilt' final divorce tlt'(:r('('. Nevertheless, the trial court
took till' testimon~' of sevpral witnesses in snpport of Clarence's
motion. Bt·tty then filed an application with this court for a
writ of prohibition and. after transfer of the petition to the
District Court of Appeal. thp aitPl'llative writ issued on August
10th, and it is still in force.
T"irtl Oourt ,Jurisd1~ction Pending Appeal
The first qnestion to bt' determined is whether the trial
('ourt had jurisdiction to enter any order allowing Gerald
to leave the state pending apPt'al from the March 9th custody
order.
[1] S(,ction ~46 of the Cod!' of Civil Procedure provides:
~'\Yhellever an appeal is perfet:il'd, as provided in the preced·
ing f'eetions of this chapter. it stays aU further proceedings
ill the eonrt below upon the jndgment or order appealed
frolll. 01' npoll til(' matt!'rs embrac('<l therein . . . . " It is
thrrE'fore well I'stablisht>d that an app<'al from a custody order
depriws thr trial conrt of jnris(lietion to change the custody
status at tIlt' time of the apllt'al. (Yo.~bllr{) v. Vosburg, 137
Cal. 4!)~. 49;) 168 P. 694] ; E.r parte Qllcirolo, 119 Cal. 633.
636 r:i1 P. 9;)61; Browne v. Browne. 60 Cal.App.2d 637, 642
p·n P.2d 4281; .1foon v. Superior Court, 59 Cal.App.2d 447.
449 [139 P.2d 84] ; In re Browning, 108 Cal.App. 503, 506
[291 P. 6501; see 2 Cal..hIr. 4]6-418; 27 C.J.S., Divorce,
§ 324f. ) "An app('al from a juilgment or order would be
futilE', and this court would be deprived of jurisdiction if
pE'nding the appeal th(' jndgm('nt or order appealed from could
be modifiecl or rhangrd into ~omethillg radically diffrrent by a
snbse<]lIE'nt O!·dPr of. th<' tl'illl I'onrt." (Vnxburn v. VoSbltrg.
Mtpra. 137 Cal. 493. 496.) [2] The lof0;8 of jurisdiction is so
I'omph'te that {'wn flll' COIlf't'ut of th(' parties is ineff!'cth'e to
reiuv('st tht' trial romt with jurisdiction over the sUbjr.ct
mattl'r of the app!'al. (Kinard v . .Jordan, 175 Cal. 13, 16 [164
P.8941.)
[3a] ClarPlwe contendf' that thE' trial court ma~· Jl(~vprtheless
allow "temporary" remo\'al to ~t'w .Tersey pending appeal,
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relying upon the provision in section 946 that "the court below
may proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and
not affected by the order appealed from." Clarence points
out that the "order appealed from" is the order of March 9tb
modifying the final decree by transferring eustody of Gerald
from Betty to Clarence. He states that his application to
('uroll the boy in the New Jersey school "has absolutely no
I'elatiollship" to the cU!'Itody order, but would merely change
the locale of the 1:$oy's education from the Menlo School to
New Jersey.
The contention that the removal proceeding is not upon
a matter embraced within the custody appeal disregards
the factual setting of this action. At the time Betty perfected
her appeal from the modification order of March 9th, the
parents had joint legal custody and Gerald was enrolled
full time at Menlo School, where Betty wished him to be
educated, where she could visit him, and where she could
invoke the protection of California courts to enforce the
provisions of the final divorce decree. [4] The essence of custody is the companionship of the child and the right to make
decisions regarding his care and control, education, health, and
religion. (See Roche v. Roche 25 Cal.2d 141, 144 [152 P.2d
999].) [3b] If the ('hild could be removed 3,000 miles to a
school in New Jersey, chosen by Clarence against Betty's
will, the provisions of the custody decree favorable to Betty
would be vitiated. The proposed New Jersey order, in fact,
would be more severe from Betty's viewpoint than the order ,
appealed from. Under the March 9th order Betty lost legal
cllstody, but the court at least ordered that the boy remain
at a California school where Betty could visit him. The New
Jersey order, by contrast, would effectively end visitation
rights. Although the removal is labelled "temporary," it
,,"ould substantially destroy the custody status at the time
the appeal was taken, in clear violation of the provisions of
!;pction 946. (Vosburg v. Vosburg, supra, 137 Cal. 493, 495.)
[5] Moreover, an examination of the recognition given
custody decrees ill other states demonstrates that the phrase
in section 946, "all further proceedings in the court below
upon the judgment or order appealed from," must be interpreted to include action by a trial court giving "temporary"
permission to take a child from the state pending appeal from
a custody order. [6] Although it may be assumed that the
California decree would receive the same respect in other
states that foreign custody decrees receive in our courts (see

-)
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Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Ca1.2d 763, 779 [197 P.2d
739] ), the physical presence of the child would give the foreign
state jurisuictiou to d<.'cide for itself what action woplU be in
his best interests. (Sampsell v. Superior Court, supra, 32
Ca1.2d 763, 779; Foster v. Foster, 8 Ca1.2d 719, 726 [68 P.2d
719] ; Titcomb v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. 34, 39 [29 P.2d
206] ; see In re B's Settlement, 1 Ch. 54 (1940); 160 A.L.R.
408; 17 Am.Jur. 521.) [7] Custody decrees are universally
subject to modification upon a showing of facts that require
a change in the order to protect what the foreign court considers the welfare of the child. Even if the foreign forum
eventually follows the California decision, protracted litigation is meanwhile inevitable. Thus, in the Foster proceedings
the South Dakota decree was eventually enforced in this
state, but only after the parent disobeying the South Dakota
decree kept the children in this state for three years of trial·
and appellate litigation. (See Foster v. Foster, 8 Cal.2d 719
[68 P.2d 719] ; Foster v. Foster, 5 Cal.2d 669 [55 P.2d 1175] ;
Foster v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.2d 125 [47 P.2d 701] ; Foster
v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.App.2d 466 [41 P.2d 187].) Again,
in Langan v. Langan, 150 F.2d 979, the father disregarded
the provisions of a California decree and fled with the child
to Maryland. The mother followed him and was awarded
custody by the Mary~and court but the father moved on to
the District of Columbia before the mother could obtain physical custody of the child. Despite the conduct of the father,
the District of Columbia court awarded custody to the father
on the ground of changed circumstances. The father thus
shopped from state to state until he found a court willing to
award him custody. There are many other instances where
parents violated court orders forbidding removal of a minor
from the state with impunity. (See In re Memmi, 80 Cal.App.
2d 295, 300 [181 P.2d 885] ; Cook v. Cook, 135 F.2d 945, 946;
Gaunt v. Gaunt, 160 Okla. 195, 196 [16 P.2d 579] ; Crowell
v. Crowell, 184 Ore. 467, 472 [198 P.2d 992]; Haynie v.
Hudgins, 122 Miss. 838, 853 [85 So. 99] ; White v. White, 77
N.H. 26, 30 [86 A. 353] j Commonwealth ex rel. Rogers v.
Daven, 298 Pa. 416, 423 [148 A. 524] ; Goldsmith v. Salkey,
131 Tex. 139, 146 [112 S.W.2d 165, 116 A.L.R. 1293] ; Jones
v. Bowman, 13 Wyo. 79, 89 [77 P. 439] ; People ex rel. Wagner
v. Torrence, 94 Colo. 47,51 [27 P.2d 1038] ; Helton v. Crawley,
241 Iowa 296 [41 N.W.2d 60]; Ex parte Peddicord, 269
Mich. 142, 145 [256 N.W. 833].) We do not mean to imply
that the foregoing decisions were incorrectly decided. They
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are cited only to demonstrate that Betty cannot be adequately
protected during her appeal if the trial court may enter orders
allowing her child to be taken from the state.
[8] Clarence contends that the trial court "has power to
make all necessary orders needed for the child's welfare and
is not to be blocked by an appeal based on mere partisan interest and desire." This contention assumes the question to
be decided by the appeal: did the trial court correctly decide
that the status of the child's custody as of March 9th was not
in his best interests Y The paramount concern in custody proceedings is the walfare of the child (Puckett v. Puckett, 21
Ca1.2d 833, 839 [136 P.2d 1]), but Betty has the right and
duty to safeguard Gerald until determination of the appeal.
Clarence asserts that the best interests of Gerald require his
attendance at the New Jersey school, but Betty does not
agree and, until custody is taken from her and the order
affirmed on appeal, questions of the child '8 education are
governed by provisions of the final divorce decree as modified
by the consent order. It may be noted that if extraordinary
circumstances requiring protection of the child during the
appeal arise, application may be made to the appellate court
for appropriate relief. (See Gantner v. Gantner, post,
p.691 [242 P.2d 329].)
[9] Clarence invokes decisions to the effect that pending
appeal a trial court has jurisdiction to require a father to
make payments for child support. (Civ. Code, § 137.2; DixO'1/,
v. Dixon, 216 Cal. 443,444 [14 P.2d 498].) The fact that a
trial court has the power to protect the child during the appeal
by continuing the natural obligation of a father to support
his child does not mean that it has the power to issue orders
that would render futile the appellate determination on the
merits. (Vo,~burg v. Vosburg, 137 Cal. 493, 496 [68 P. 694].)
[3e] Clarence next contends that any order affecting GeraId's education is not a matter embraced in the appeal from
the March 9th order, on the ground that Betty consented to the
Menlo School provision in the final decree and a consent order
cannot be appealed. (See cases collected in 2 Cal.Jur. 225.)
The record does not indicate that the May 25th consent, as
adopted in the March 9th decree, waived Betty's rights of
physical custody for more than one semester, and there is nothing to show that Betty ever consented at any time that the
child could be enrolled in any school other than the Menlo
School. In any event, Betty has filed a valid appeal from that
part of the March 9th order awarding custody to Clarence,

)
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and that appeal would be undermined by an order allowing
the child to be taken from the state.
Clarence contends that the appeal did not operate to
stay the New Jersey order on the ground that Betty had
voluntarily delivered the boy to the Menlo School before perfecting her appeal. Clarence relies on In re McK~an, 82 Cal.
App. 580. 584 [256 P. 226], where the mother did not appeal
until after execution of the order appealed from, which required her to give up custody to the father. The court properly refused to issue habeas corpus to return the child to the
mother, on the ground that under section 946 the appeal
stayed only future action by the trial court and did not undo
action taken by the parties before the appeal. In re Siddall,
143 Cal. 313, 315 [76 P. 1115] ; see In re BrO'W'lting, 108 Cal.
App. 503, 507 [291 P. 650].) The McKean decision is inapplicable here, since Betty enrolled the boy in the Menlo
School pursuant to the May 25th modification of the final
decree, and not in obedience to the March 9th decree, the
subject of the present appeal.
[10] A litigant in a custody action is entitled to appellate
review before his rights are finally determined. If the appellant is not protected from adverse acti~n by the trial court
that would destroy the fruits of his appeal, the right of appeal
is illusory. In contending that the trial court can permit
removal of the children pending appeal, Clarence in effect
contends that custody orders should be immediately executed
and not stayed by appeal. The statutes and decisions of this
state are opposed to this contention, although some states
have a contrary rule. (See Scheffers v. Scheffers, 241 Iowa
1217 [44 N.W.2d 676, 679].)
[11] In summary, at the time Betty perfected her appeal,
IIhe had custody of Gerald under a decree providing that the
boy should attend the Menlo School. An order which so
disturbs the custody of the child as to permit him to be taken
out of this state, pending final determination of the appeal,
would be an aet in excess of the jurisdiction of the trial court.
(VoJlbllrg v. VOJlbllrg, 81tpra.; see State ex rel. Ca.~h v. District
COltrt. 58 Mont. 316, 318 [195 P. 549] ; Nolan v. Nolan, 257
Ill.App. 401, 403; cases collected in 163 A.L.R. 1320; 3 Am.Jur.
192; 27 C.J.S., Divorce, § 324f.) [12] The writ of prohibition
may therefore issue to prevent the trial court from entering
the New Jersey· order. (Fosfer v. Superior COl(rt, 4 Ca1.2d
J25, ]27 [47 P.2<1 701].)
.,
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Jlotioll for A.ttorney Fees and Costs

On St'ptembf'l' 14, 19;31, Betty applied to the District Court
of ApPt'al for attorney fees and costs incurred in the prohibition proct't'ding. The application will be considered as
addressed to this cOllrt after the hearing was granted following
the District COllrt decision. Betty alleges that she does not
ha ve the financial resources to prosecute the prohibition pro('(-'cding, that Clarence has a financial worth of $1,000,000,
and that he has a yearly income of $100,000.
'file petition for a writ of prohibition was filed July 31, 1951,
and the alternative writ issued on August 10, 1951. Insofar
as the present appli.cation is for counsel fees for services performed before September 14th, the date of the application,
the motion must be denied. (Warner v. Warner, 34 Cal.2d
838,840 [215 P.2d 20].) The application for services after
that date, however, may be granted if the statute governing
allowance of attorney ft'es applies to original proceedings in
prohibition.
[13] Civil Code, section 137.3, enacted in 1951, provides
that, "during the pendency of any action for divorce . . . the
court may order the husband . . . to pay such amount as may
be reasonably necessary for the cost of maintaining or defending the action and for attorney's fees." Section 137.3 is a
recodification of the first sentence of former Civil Code, section
137. It was settled under section 137 that the phrase therein,
"when an action for divorce is pending," embraced many
diverse proceedings growing out of the divorce action and
arising after entry of the final decree. (Wilson v. Wilson,
33 Ca1.2d 107, 115 [199 P.2d 671] (proceeding to enforce
distribution of community property) ; Reynolds v. Reynolds,
21 Ca1.2d 580, 585 [134 P.2d 251] (modification of allowance
for child support) ; Lamborn v. Lamborn, 190 Cal. 794, 796
r~n4 P. 862] (motion to modify alimony) ; Grannis v. Superior
COllrt, 143 Cal. 630, 633 [77 P. 647] (motion to set aside final
(lcl'ree undt'l' Code Civ. Proc., § 473) ; Kohn v. Kahn, 95 Cal.
App.2d 722, 724 [214 P.2d 80] (construction of property
settlement) ; Parker v. Parker, 22 Cal.App.2d 139, 142 [70 P.2d
100:3] (mandamus to enter judgment for delinquent alimony) ;
Moore v. Gosbey, 130 Cal.App. 70, 73 [19 P.2d 995] (motion
to modify. alimony, made 10 years after final decree]; see
cases collected in 15 A.L.R.2d 1270.)
On principle ,there is no difference between actions in which
a woman is compelled by her former husband to resist by an
appeal a proceeding brought by him to modify a custody or
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alimony award and actions in which she is compelled to seek
prohibition to prevent improper modification of such awards.
I n either ca~ she 'may be nnable to retain counsel to represent
her, and the policy underlying section 137.3 and the cases
above cited are controlling.
[14] In maintaining that section 137.3 does not apply to
prohibition proceedings, Clarence first contends that Betty can
recover suit money only when he is the other party to the
litigation, and that here the respondent is the superior court.
The statute does not support this contention. Section 137.3
is not framed to limit its application to actions in which the
other spouse is a "plaintiff" or "defendant." Instead, it
applies during the "PElndency of any action for divorce" and
payments are to be made by the "husband." Moreover,
the adverse party in the present proceeding is clearly Clarence,
the "real party in interest," and not the superior court, the
nominal respondent. The same attorneys represent Clarence
and the respondent. The prohibition action is directed against
Clarence, since Betty's success would preclude the trial court '
from making the custody order that he requests. [15] In the
early development of the writ of prohibition, it is true, the
writ was used by the king's courts to increase their authority
at the expense of the ecclesiastical courts (1 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 3d ed., pp. 229, 594) and the lower
court was thus a party to the litigation in a substantial sense.
In California practice, however, an application to an appellate
court for the writ is simply one of several means by which a
litigant may obtain a review of action or threatened action
by a trial court. (See 36 Cal.L.Rev. 75, 101-105; 23 So. Cal.
L.Rev. 530, 533-537.) [16] The objective is the same as in
an appeal, to prevent the trial court from taking action favorable to the other party. Thus the Rules on Appeal recognize
the adversary character of prohibition proceedings by providing that the petition for the writ must disclose the name of
the real party in interest (Rule 56 (a) ), that points and authorities must be served upon him (Rule 56(b», and that he
may demur or answer to the petition (Rule 56 (c) ). [17] Further, it is established that counsel fees may be recovered in
mandamus proceedings in which the superior court is the nominal respondent. (Parker v. Park.er, 22 Cal.App.2d 139, 142
[70 P.2d 1003].)
Clarence relies on McCarthy v. Superior Court, 65 Cal.App.
2d 42, 43 [149 ·P.2d 871], holding that a successful applicant
for a writ of prohibition cannot recover costs against the
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state under Code of Civil Procedure, section 1095. The McCarthy case would be in point only if Betty attempted to
recover counsel fees from the state or the Superior Court.
Clarence also invokes Havemeyer v. Superior Court, 84 Cal.
327,372 [24 P. 121, 18 Am.St.Rep. 192, 10 L.R.A. 627], which
held that the real party in interest should receive notice of the
prohibition matter by being served with copies of the petition
and being given a reasonable time to appear. The record shows
that Clarence received ample notice and filed an answer to the
petition. Nothing in the Havemeyer case supports Clarence's
assertion that any order requiring him to pay counsel fees
would be "without due process." .
No reason thus appears why the fact that the superior
court is the nominal respondent in this proceeding bars an
award of attorney fees against the real party in interest
under section 137.3.
[18] Clarence contends finally that the Supreme Court
is not the proper forum for thili! proceeding. This contention
must be sustained. Assuming that we have jurisdiction to
entertain an application for counsel fees, as a power necessarily incident to our original jurisdiction to issue the writ
of prohibition, we should not pass upon an application involving questions of fact on the basis of the printed record and
affidavits when a more satisfactory alternative exists.
In Parker v. Parker, 22 Cal.App.2d 139 [70 P .2d 1003], the
trial court awarded the wife counsel fees during the pendency
of mandamus proceedings within the original jurisdiction of
the District Court of Appeal. This procedure has many advantages. The trial court, with the parties before it for
examination, is better qualified than the appellate court to
pass on the amount of suit money, if any, that should be
awarded. (See Bobbitt v. Bobbitt, 297 Ky. 28, 29 [178 S.W.2d
986] ; Craig v. Craig, 115 Va. 764, 765 [80 S.E. 507].)
The trial court is not deprived of jurisdiction to award
counsel fees because the action is an original proceeding before
t.he appellate court. The decision whether the peremptory writ should issue is only a part of the whole litigation
betwt'en Clarence and Betty on the custody matter. In an
analogous situation of an appeal from a custody or alimony
order, the lower court retains power to order payment of
connsel fees to enable the wife to prosecute her appeal, and
such order is not considered in excess of the trial court's
jurisdiction as a "further proceeding in the court below upon
the judgment or order appealed from." (Code Civ. Proe.,
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§ 946; Reilly v. Reilly, 60 Cal. 624, 626; DeLeshe v. DeLeshe,
80 Cal.App.2d 517, 518 [181 P.2d 931].) Like a stay on
appea1. the alternatiye writ protects the moving party and
the appellate ('ourt by maintaining the status quo pending
decision by the appellate court. It does not deprive the trial
{'ourt of jurisdiction to determine that both litigants are
fairly represented.
Unller the cireumstances of this case, Betty should not
be penalized because her application was erroneously made
to the appellate court. Accordingly, the denial of her motion
for attorney fees will be without prejudice to application
to the trial court for attorney fees and costs incurred since
the date of the motion, September 14, 1951.
The motion for attorney fees and costs is denied without
prejudice. Let the peremptory writ of prohibition issue as
prayed.

Gibson, C. •T., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J.,
and Spence, J., concurred.

[So F. Xo. 18512. In Bank. }lar. 25, 1952.]

VALLEJO GANTNER, Petitioner, ". SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAX FRANCISCO,
Respondent; NEILMA BAILLIEU GANTNER, Real
Part~· in Interest.
[1] Divorce-Custody of Children-Appeal-Eft'ect.-While an appeal by divorced hUtiband from an order im'olving the custody
of children of th~ divorced parties is pending, the trial court
lal!ks jurisdiction to enter an order permitting the divorced
wife to take the children to a foreign country for a "temporary" vacation, since such order would be a proceeding on a
matter embraced in the order appealed f1'oll1. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 946.)

PROCEEDIXG in prohibition to restrain the Superior
Court of the City and County of San Francisco from entering
any order allowing temporary removal of minor children of
petitioner from jurisdiction prior to final determination of
proceeding brought by him to determine custody provisions of
n final divorce judgment. Writ granted.

flJ See Cal.Jur., Divorce and Separation, ~ 141.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Divorce, § 288.

